Let’s put an end to the speculation

Ideally, we would have preferred to avoid this post. However, the articles and comments published in response to Collabora’s and Michael Meeks’ biased posts compel us to provide this background information on the events that led to the current situation.

Unfortunately, we have to start from the very beginning, but we’ll try to keep it brief. The launch of the LibreOffice project and The Document Foundation was handled with great enthusiasm by the founding group. They were driven by a noble goal, but also by a bit of healthy recklessness. After all, it was impossible to imagine what would happen after September 28, 2010, the date of the announcement.

At the time, nobody could imagine that the companies that had supported OpenOffice.org until then like IBM would create Apache OpenOffice to kill LibreOffice. Also, if the project were to be successful, it would require resources greater than those available, and above all, a deep management experience.

Fortunately, the project grew quite rapidly. However, the founders’ different backgrounds and opinions were at the same time the reason for some bold decisions – many of which right – as well as a few mistakes, which are the root cause of some of the current problems:

  • granting free use of the LibreOffice brand only to companies in the ecosystem, to allow them to sell the software in Microsoft and Apple’s online stores;
  • awarding contracts for the development of LibreOffice – new features, fixing “legacy” bugs, etc. – to companies whose representatives were on The Document Foundation’s Board of Directors, and who were active throughout the procurement process.

Both of these decisions were found to be incorrect for reasons relating to the non-profit law, to which The Document Foundation must adhere. They violated the law itself. When this fact was brought to the attention of the Board of Directors by the foundation’s legal counsels, the companies that had benefited from these errors sought to maintain the status quo rather than finding a solution. At the time – from the end of 2021 to the middle of 2022 – this could have been achieved swiftly and with minimal difficulty.

This attitude increased tensions within the BoD, adding to pre-existing frictions that began in 2020 when the majority of the new board decided to terminate the plan to transfer many of TDF’s tasks and assets to a parallel organisation called The Document Collective (TDC). Several issues that the current board had to solve stemmed from elements of that project that had been partially executed.

The origins of TDC are controversial. One reason given for setting up the parallel organisation was the “alleged inefficiency” of the TDF team [1], which was expressed by some of the directors. Unfortunately, instead of addressing the supposed problem with a reorganization or some training, the BoD decided to react by creating a new problem: a parallel structure with a supposedly “highly efficient” team that would highlight the alleged inefficiency of the TDF team.

TDC was presented at the LibreOffice Conference in Almería in 2019 without prior notice, raising concerns within the team and the community. This was partly because the parallel organisation’s project envisaged leveraging TDF’s financial resources as startup funds. This attempt resulted in permanent damage to relations between the project’s components, and especially between certain BoD members and the team.

After years of discussions marked by accusations and finger-pointing, during which no real progress was made in resolving the legal issues, the German authorities overlooking non profit foundations requested an audit whose results confirmed that resolving the issues was absolutely necessary to avoid losing non-profit status, with unforeseen consequences.

Unfortunately, the presence of company representatives on the Board of Directors (BoD), who were elected by employees of those same companies that are also TDF members, caused further delays to finding a solution, which has not yet been reached.

Fortunately, the introduction of restrictive measures – such as the decision to forfeit TDF membership status of Collabora employees – and the freezing of tenders, alongside the introduction of a robust procurement policy for development, has resulted in a positive outcome for the third audit [2]. At least, the BoD has demonstrated a willingness to break the deadlock that has persisted since 2022.

The board also reviewed governance issues from the past and set clear rules to minimise the risk of them recurring in future. These rules are set out in the Code of Ethics and Fiduciary Duties, the updated Conflict of Interest Policy and the Community Bylaws.

Of course, if we could rewind the course of history, some of the choices made since 2010 would hopefully be different and no one would repeat the mistakes or the wrong behaviours of the past.

As we said at the beginning, we would gladly have done without this post, but it was necessary to set the record straight and avoid speculation.

TDF has been preparing for some time for Collabora’s announcement, by hiring developers and exploring new partnership opportunities to support a growing interest in LibreOffice on the desktop, still a viable option for many deployments, the cloud and mobile, and in ODF as the preferred document format for governments worldwide.

Thanks to the growing importance of free and open source software, as well as open standards for document formats, the concepts that we have been advocating for over twenty years and have finally reached political institutions and users, The Document Foundation and the LibreOffice project are well positioned for the future.

[1] The Document Foundation’s daily activities are managed by a team of employees and contractors who handle administrative tasks, infrastructure, release management and developer’s mentoring, and coordinate community, quality assurance, UX, documentation, localization and marketing.

[2] The first audit in 2023 raised concerns about the mentioned issues. The second audit in 2024 confirmed the concerns. The third audit in 2025 did not raise concerns.

Document formats: a mystery to many

Euro-Office’s announcement – which sees IONOS, Nextcloud and other companies coming together to create a European alternative to office productivity software – has predictably sparked a wave of comments. Most of these focus on the issue of licensing: is the code open source? Who controls the repository? What are the conditions for forking, modifying or implementing it?

While these are all valid questions, they fail to address the most important issue. The fact that almost no one is asking the question that matters tells us something significant about how the debate on digital sovereignty has been framed and who benefits from that framing.

A licence tells you who owns the software, while the format tells you who owns the data

A licence can be renegotiated, modified or updated. The history of FLOSS is full of projects that have changed governance models, divided communities, or changed course under new management. Licence terms are important, but they operate at the level of the software artefact.

The native document format operates at a completely different level. It is the encoding level of every document produced, archived, and exchanged by institutions that adopt the software. It is the invisible structure of administrative memory within which public documents exist for years, or even generations. It is the infrastructure.

If Euro-Office is supplied with OOXML as the default native format – even if it is wrapped in an open licence, hosted on European servers or governed by a European legal entity – every document drafted by public administrations, schools and institutions will be written in a format designed around the behaviour of a single vendor’s application.

OOXML is governed by a specification that is so complex and internally inconsistent that it compromises interoperability. As if that were not enough, it is optimised for backward compatibility with Microsoft Office rather than for seamless exchange between systems.

The licensing issue asks: who controls the code? The format issue asks: who controls the data? These are not equivalent situations. The latter has long-term implications for public archives, administrative continuity, and the practical significance of vendor independence.

For thirty years, the FLOSS and digital rights communities have been working on licences based on the fundamental principle that a licence equals freedom. This work has produced enormous value, but it has also created an unintentional blind spot.

Microsoft has spent decades conducting one of the most effective user education campaigns in the history of the software industry. However, what it has taught is dependency. Consequently, a generation of users, administrators, developers and even FLOSS advocates has grown up treating OOXML documents as the natural unit of document exchange — just like water flowing from a tap. OOXML files are not perceived as a lock-in mechanism, but as normal documents.

This is an incredible strategic achievement. Microsoft has managed to transform a proprietary file format, which was designed to replicate the behaviour of its own applications rather than enable transparent content exchange, into an interoperability standard.

Compatibility with the OOXML format is not viewed as a courtesy to the monopoly holder; rather, it has become a feature that alternative software must provide to prove its legitimacy. Lock-in has been transformed into an advantage: users are not trapped in Microsoft’s format; they are simply using the format that everyone else uses.

The FOSS community, which should be particularly vigilant about such dynamics, has often uncritically accepted Microsoft’s approach. Indeed, when evaluating an alternative productivity suite, the first question is often about the ability to open OOXML files rather than about the native format and whether it enables interoperability. Unfortunately, the alternative is judged according to criteria subtly dictated by Microsoft.

Consequently, format policy is treated as a secondary technical issue rather than the major political issue it really is. Meanwhile, Microsoft has pursued a precise and successful strategy of securing OOXML certification as an ISO standard to define it as ‘open’, while ensuring that licensing issues take precedence over format issues.

The result is that “supporting ODF” has become a box to tick rather than a specific commitment. This explains why all office suites today claim to support ODF. The practical implications of this support – such as whether ODF is the native or default format, or the format in which documents are created and stored without user intervention – are rarely considered, let alone addressed.

The test that matters

Euro-Office presents itself as a genuine European alternative: an infrastructure project for digital sovereignty. This claim deserves to be put to the test in terms of whether institutions will manage to free themselves from Microsoft lock-in, or if they will simply reproduce it under a different banner.

The test is simple and admits only one answer: ODF will be the native format of Euro-Office; the format in which documents are created, stored, and exchanged by default without user configuration or technical intervention.

Not: Euro-Office supports ODF because, in a nominal sense, everything supports ODF. Users can save in ODF format because this is a compatibility feature, not a commitment to true digital sovereignty.

If the answer is yes, then Euro-Office represents a significant structural break with the dominant proprietary format. However, if the answer implies “compatibility”, “user choice”, “transition paths” or “broad format support”, then Euro-Office is, regardless of the licence, a server migration that leaves Microsoft’s lock-in on data unchanged.

Digital sovereignty is not achieved by changing who hosts the software, but by changing the format in which data is encoded. European institutions, public administrations, and civil society organisations considering Euro-Office deserve a direct and immediate answer to this question before making any further commitments.

ODF has to be native, default, and by design.

Since its foundation, the Document Foundation has supported ODF as an open standard for document exchange. ODF (ISO/IEC 26300) is the only document format standard designed from the outset to ensure interoperability, long-term preservation, and total vendor independence.

Euro-Office: sovereign in name only, or in reality too?

The announcement of the Euro-Office is welcome news. The coalition is credible, the governance is sound and the timing is perfect. Europe needs office software, and The Document Foundation is delighted to see such significant players allocating resources to make it happen.

However, we have a question. It is not meant to be hostile, but it is the only question that matters.

What is the native document format of Euro-Office?

The press release promises full compatibility with Microsoft formats. We are well aware of the logic behind migration: organisations moving away from Microsoft need to be certain that their documents will survive the transition. But “full compatibility with Microsoft formats” is certainly not a definition of sovereignty, but rather the definition of a different kind of dependency.

OOXML is a format designed, controlled and managed solely by Microsoft. Building a European office suite prioritising compatibility with OOXML means ensuring that the European document infrastructure remains subordinate to architectural decisions made in Redmond. The hosting moves to Europe, but the lock-in remains in Redmond.

The alternative exists, is mature and is a law in several European jurisdictions. ODF, the Open Document Format, is an ISO standard developed through an open and transparent process, which is not controlled or managed by a company. The German Deutschland-Stack has made it mandatory, and the EU Commission has approved it. It is not the LibreOffice format, but a European public good.

The Euro-Office press release does not mention ODF even once.

We are not asking Euro-Office to abandon support for Microsoft’s proprietary format. LibreOffice itself reads and writes OOXML: compatibility is a necessity for users, not an ideological concession. We are asking whether ODF will be the native format, the one in which documents are created, archived and exchanged between European public administrations.

This distinction is fundamental, and the time to define the native document format is now, before the architecture is finalised and the implementations take place. If necessary, we are here to help with the deployment of the ODF standard as native document format.

The coalition has the credibility and resources to build something truly innovative. We hope it will use them to build a project of sovereignty and not merely a tool for server migration, flying a European flag but with a lock-in firmly rooted in Redmond.

The Document Foundation is a non-profit foundation and the home of LibreOffice, the world’s leading open-source office suite. LibreOffice implements ODF as its native format and supports a wide range of document formats, including the import and export of OOXML.

Open Letter to European Citizens

The door to digital sovereignty is open, please come in

For decades, a community of developers, activists, researchers and public officials has quietly worked on the idea that free and open-source software based on open standards is not only the best technical choice, but also the only one compatible with democratic governance.

We have created the necessary tools, overseen migrations and provided user training. We have also drafted policy documents and presented them to committees.

We have documented the consequences of public documents being readable only by software developed in a single country, managed by a single company and subject to the laws of a different jurisdiction, as well as the commercial decisions of a board of directors.

The French gendarmerie, the Austrian Ministry of Defence and the German state of Schleswig-Holstein – to name but a few examples – have taken action, alongside regions, provinces and cities across Europe.

We have always been here, and not with a product to sell, but with the knowledge, patience and sincere conviction that public institutions belong to the public, and that this also applies to their digital infrastructure.

Sometimes we were listened to, but far more often we were merely tolerated, at best with a smile that seemed to say: “I know, but what can I do about this?”

And now, suddenly, the situation has changed, and not because the arguments have changed – there was no need for that – nor because the technology has changed, as it was already excellent.

The situation has changed because the geopolitical balance has shifted, and the dependence that once seemed a convenience now appears for what it has always been: a structural vulnerability.

We are glad that this moment has arrived, and we like to think that this clarity – which the evidence never managed to achieve – is also down to us, and not just the geopolitical crisis.

But we ask European citizens, and through them those who govern European countries, to understand one extremely important thing: the door to digital sovereignty does not open simply by choosing different software, but by understanding what sovereignty actually entails.

It requires open document formats, not as a preference, but as a legal and technical guarantee that a document produced today will be readable in thirty years’ time, by any compliant application, without the permission of any company. The format is not a detail, but the foundation.

It requires open fonts, because a document displayed differently on different systems is not an interoperable document, regardless of the standard it claims to follow. The display layer is just as important as the data layer.

It requires continuity of expertise: the people and institutions that have carried out this work, often without recognition and sometimes without resources, are not a lobby to be managed but a valuable repository of knowledge to be engaged.

It requires honesty about what “open” means. A coalition that speaks of digital sovereignty but chooses as its default document format one designed to replicate the behaviour of proprietary software is not building sovereignty but a new dependency under a different banner.

We have been here for years, and we will still be here for years to come.

The FLOSS ecosystem did not need a geopolitical crisis to believe in open standards. We have always believed in them, because they are right—technically, legally, and democratically.

Now that Europe is ready, we have just one request: listen to us carefully, unlike what you have done in the past. The lesson is not simply “use free and open-source software”. The lesson is: understand why it is important, and understand it thoroughly.

The tools exist, the knowledge exists, and above all, the community exists.

What happens next will depend solely on you: Europe’s digital sovereignty could become a genuine architectural commitment or remain yet another rebranding of dependency.

We hope, and would like to be sure, that you choose the first option.

Over the coming weeks, four articles will explore these topics in depth: the architecture of document formats, the hidden politics of font rendering, lessons learned from real-world migration experiences, and what a credible European policy on open standards would actually look like. We invite you to read them.

ODF Toolkit Project Announces Release 0.13.0: Last Release Supporting JDK 11

ODF logo

BERLIN, Germany — The ODF Toolkit community is proud to announce the official release of version 0.13.0. This release marks a significant transition point in the project’s history, representing the last release to support JDK 11, with the project pivoting toward modern Java long-term support (LTS) releases.

Release Highlights: Stability and Modernisation

The 0.13.0 release provides a stable, high-performance foundation for programmatic manipulation of ODF 1.2 documents.

  • Final JDK 11 Support: This is the definitive release for users operating on Java 11 environments.
  • Broad Compatibility: Validated across the Java ecosystem on Windows 10, macOS (Apple Silicon M3), and Ubuntu 24.04 LTS.
  • Automated Deployment: GitHub release artefacts are now built automatically with Temurin JDK, ensuring a transparent, reproducible supply chain.

FOSDEM 2026: Setting the Stage for 1.0.0

Following the release, the project’s core developers met in person at FOSDEM in Brussels, using the opportunity to align on the project’s next major milestone. During the event, the team finalised the roadmap for the upcoming 1.0.0 Release Candidate. Discussions focused on resolving the remaining blocking issues in the toolkit’s code-generation engine, paving the way for a more robust and extensible architecture.

Immediate Future: JDK 17 and Apache Jena 5

The project has already moved its development baseline to JDK 17 for the upcoming version, 0.14.0.

  • Apache Jena 5.6.0: The shift to JDK 17 enables integration with the latest Apache Jena library, significantly enhancing the toolkit’s ability to handle document metadata and RDF.
  • Early Access: A 0.14.0-SNAPSHOT release is now available for developers who want to test these new features.

Expanding the Core Team

The project continues to grow its community of maintainers. Following discussions between Michael Stahl, Oliver Rau, and Svante Schubert, Axel Howitz has been granted commit rights, strengthening the project’s long-term sustainability and development capacity. Axel’s contributions since joining last year have been instrumental in maintaining the project’s momentum toward its 1.0.0 goals.

Availability

The ODF Toolkit 0.13.0 is available via the official project page.

About the ODF Toolkit

The ODF Toolkit is a community-driven, open-source Java library for creating, scanning, and manipulating OpenDocument Format (ODF) files. By providing a lightweight API that operates independently of any office suite, it remains a preferred choice for server-side document automation.

European Commission’s use of Microsoft 365 breaches data protection law for EU institutions and bodies

The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) has found that the European Commission (Commission) has breached several provisions of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725, the EU data protection law for EU institutions (EUIs), in its use of Microsoft 365, including those relating to the transfer of personal data outside the EU and the European Economic Area (EEA). The EDPS is imposing corrective measures on the Commission.

In particular, the Commission has failed to provide adequate safeguards to ensure that personal data transferred outside the EU/EEA are afforded the same level of protection as that guaranteed within the EU/EEA.
Furthermore, in its contract with Microsoft, the Commission did not sufficiently specify the types of personal data to be collected and for what explicit and specified purposes when using Microsoft 365. The Commission’s breaches as data controller also relate to data processing, including the transfer of personal data, carried out on its behalf.

The EDPS has therefore decided to order the Commission to suspend, with effect from 9 December 2024, all data flows resulting from the use of Microsoft 365 to Microsoft, its subsidiaries and sub-processors located in countries outside the EU/EEA that are not covered by an adequacy decision.

In effect, the EDPS has confirmed what we have been arguing for years, namely that the only individual productivity solutions that also guarantee data protection and support the concept of Europe’s digital sovereignty – technological independence from the commercial decisions of high-tech companies, especially from the US – are FOSS solutions such as LibreOffice combined with a standard, open and independent data format such as the Open Document Format.

The EDPS, though, has also decided to order the Commission to bring the processing operations resulting from its use of Microsoft 365 into compliance with the EU Regulation 2018/1725. The Commission has until 9 December 2024 to demonstrate compliance with both orders.

The EDPS considers that the corrective measures it imposes (described in the document annex [1]) are appropriate, necessary and proportionate in light of the seriousness and duration of the infringements found.
Many of the infringements found concern all processing operations carried out by the Commission, or on its behalf, when using Microsoft 365, and impact many individuals.

Unfortunately, all the remedies identified by the EDPS relate to Microsoft 365, and therefore do not address the root of the problem by suggesting the use of FOSS solutions such as LibreOffice and the only truly standard, open and independent document format, the Open Document Format.

It is highly likely that Microsoft’s solution will be the usual ‘sticking plaster’ that hides the problem without addressing it, and that the lobbyists – who I am sure are already at work – will make it look appropriate in the eyes of politicians.

And if we continue to protest, knowing that we will not be heard because we do not have the same firepower as the lobbyists of the big US hi-tech companies who are present in Brussels with hundreds of professionals, we will always hear the same thing: “They all do the same…”.

[1] https://www.edps.europa.eu/press-publications/press-news/press-releases/2024/european-commissions-use-microsoft-365-infringes-data-protection-law-eu-institutions-and-bodies_en