The invisible architecture of lock-in: the layering of dependencies

There is a sophisticated mechanism by which proprietary technology ecosystems maintain their grip on users and institutions, even when those users and institutions believe they are making free choices, using open standards, and building independent digital infrastructure.

The mechanism does not work through force, but through a subtler and more durable strategy: the layering of dependencies, in which each layer obscures the one beneath it, so that when the system fails the apparent cause is something other than the real one.

It is a structural pattern with identifiable components and predictable failure modes, and with a single political consequence: the systematic attribution of interoperability failures to open alternatives rather than to the proprietary dependencies that actually cause them.

Understanding all of this is essential for anyone working on a genuine interoperability policy, because without it even the best-intentioned policy interventions address the visible symptom while leaving untouched the larger problem of the underlying architecture, which goes on working exactly as designed.

The perception of malfunction

Let us start from the user’s experience, because this is where the political damage occurs.

A document is created in Microsoft Word and sent to a colleague who uses LibreOffice on a Linux desktop. The colleague opens the file. Something is wrong: a table has shifted, the text has reflowed, a font looks different, the page breaks have moved.

The experience is familiar to millions of people in institutional settings that have adopted, or are considering adopting, open source software. It is the experience that generates the helpdesk tickets, the emails of pure frustration to the IT department, the conversations that end with “can you just send me a PDF?”, and the broader sentiment, consolidating over time, that open source software is not ready for professional use.

What is the cause of this failure? Users will blame LibreOffice, IT managers will blame format incompatibility, policymakers will blame the immaturity of open standards.

These are all wrong answers. Or rather, they are all answers to the wrong question, because they describe where the failure manifests rather than where it originates.

The actual cause is a set of interdependent technical systems, each contributing a different failure mode, all producing a single visible result.

The format contains proprietary structures that only Microsoft’s implementation handles correctly. The rendering introduces platform-dependent variations that the format specification does not control. The proprietary fonts cannot be legally bundled with open source software.

Three distinct failure modes producing the same symptom, and equally invisible to the user, who perceives only that things worked in Word and do not work in LibreOffice.

This is the architecture of layered dependency. Each layer absorbs the causal chain and emits a different signal, one that points toward the open alternative.

Layer One: the format and its hidden features

The first layer is the most discussed and the most politically visible: the document format. The conflict between ODF and OOXML has been extensively documented, litigated within standards bodies, and debated in national parliaments and in the European institutions.

But even within this well-mapped terrain, it is worth clarifying the specific mechanism of obscuration at the format layer.

OOXML, the format Microsoft Office produces by default, exists in two conformance levels. Strict is a reasonably clean specification. Transitional is something categorically different: a format designed to encode the accumulated behaviour of earlier Microsoft Office versions, preserving decades of proprietary implementation choices as normative elements of an apparently open standard.

OOXML Transitional includes VML — Vector Markup Language, a proprietary drawing format from the late 1990s that predates and contradicts the DrawingML system defined elsewhere in the same specification.

It includes references defined as “as in earlier versions of Microsoft Office”, which make sense only if one has access to those earlier versions and to their undocumented implementation details.

It includes extensions that allow Microsoft to embed proprietary functionality in documents, invisible to non-Microsoft implementations, and capable of causing silent rendering differences ranging from minor visual variation to complete layout failure.

Crucially, OOXML Transitional is what Microsoft Office produces by default.

Every time a user saves a Word document without selecting a different format, they produce a file optimised for the Microsoft ecosystem and subtly hostile to every other.

Users do not know this is happening, because the choice is made for them at the format level, and when the document fails in LibreOffice, the format layer’s contribution to that failure is invisible. The user sees a rendering problem, not a format problem.

This is the first layer of obscuration: proprietary format constructs masked by the label “industry standard”, producing errors that appear to be implementation shortcomings in the receiving software.

Layer Two: rendering and its unspecified behaviour

The second layer is less discussed, less politically visible, and for these very reasons more durable as a source of interoperability failure: text rendering.

Document format standards specify content. They define what a document contains: text, structure, logical relationships, embedded objects, and formatting instructions.

What they do not specify, and what none of the major document format standards has ever specified, is how that content should be rendered. The translation of encoded content into visible glyphs on a screen or a page is left to the implementation, and different implementations make different choices.

These choices operate across several subsystems.

Shaping engines — the software components that translate sequences of Unicode characters into sequences of glyphs, and that handle the complex rules of scripts such as Arabic, Devanagari and Thai — differ by platform.

HarfBuzz, the open source shaping engine used by LibreOffice and by most Linux applications, produces correct, standards-compliant output, but that output may differ in detail from Windows’ Uniscribe or DirectWrite engines, particularly for complex scripts with context-sensitive glyph selection.

The differences are almost always invisible for Latin text, but for the non-Latin scripts used by a significant portion of the European public sector and citizenry, they can be significant.

Hinting interpretation varies across rendering engines. Fonts embed hinting instructions — algorithms that adjust glyph outlines for crisp display at low screen resolutions — but those instructions are interpreted differently by different renderers.

A font optimised for Windows’ GDI rendering engine may display with different weight and spacing under FreeType on Linux, even at identical sizes.

The differences are minute for any single character, but they affect the perceived quality of the text and contribute to the general impression that open source environments are slightly less polished.

Line-breaking and justification algorithms are the most significant source of rendering variation and the most direct cause of document reflow.

The algorithm that determines where to break lines — how to distribute words across a line of a given width, whether and how to hyphenate, how to handle justified text — is an implementation choice that no format specification regulates.

Microsoft Word’s line-breaking algorithm is proprietary and undocumented, and it is very different from LibreOffice’s. Both are legitimate implementations of the same function, and they can produce different line breaks; different line breaks mean different page breaks; and different page breaks mean that a document paginated in Word will not be paginated the same way in LibreOffice.

This is not a defect in implementation quality, but the normal and predictable consequence of differing rendering choices that document format standards do not define. And it produces errors that are invariably attributed to the software receiving the document, because that is where the visible difference appears, rather than to the specifications that are their cause.

The rendering layer is the most technically complex component of the layered dependency and the hardest to address, but it is also the layer that most clearly reveals the dimensions of the problem: an error generated by a different choice made by two projects, attributed solely to the open source software, on the basis of an entirely unjustified, almost faith-based trust in the quality of the proprietary software.

Layer Three: fonts and the dependency on proprietary resources

The third layer completes the picture and, in many practical settings, causes the greatest damage: fonts. Here we will not analyse font-level lock-in as such, but will instead explain how the font layer operates within the layered dependency model.

Fonts interact with both layers above. At the format level, fonts appear as named references: a document declares that the body text is set in Calibri and the headings in Cambria. If those two fonts are not available on the receiving system — and this is the case on every system for which a licence for the proprietary fonts has not been acquired — the software must substitute them.

Substitution changes the metrics, and the metrics in turn change the geometry. Altered geometry produces reflow, broken layouts, forms overflowing their margins; and here too the failure is attributed to the application receiving the document.

At the rendering level, fonts interact with the shaping engine, the hinting system and the antialiasing pipeline in ways specific to each font’s design and embedded instructions. A font optimised for the Windows rendering stack will display differently under FreeType, even before any substitution occurs, and this contributes to the overall visual divergence between environments.

What makes the font layer particularly effective as a lock-in mechanism is the combination of legal unavailability and the user’s lack of information. The proprietary fonts at the heart of the problem — Calibri and Cambria, and before them Arial and Times — are not available under any kind of open source licence.

This is a legal constraint that open source software cannot overcome, but one that users perceive not as a licensing problem but as a software problem — not as the consequence of a strategy but as proof that open source software cannot handle ordinary documents.

Only Aptos, the latest of Microsoft’s proprietary fonts, is released under a partially restrictive licence, since it ties use to a download from Microsoft’s site. It can therefore be installed by Linux users too, and used legally, but this has not been communicated widely enough, so the lock-in mechanism is only reduced, not eliminated.

Why “invisible” is the key word

Each of the three layers would be a manageable problem if it were visible, and if users had the chance to see clearly that the error originates in the proprietary format, or in the insufficient rendering specifications, or in the proprietary font. Visible problems can be addressed and solved on the basis of accurate diagnosis and targeted intervention.

The strength of this scheme lies in its obscurity. Each layer acts as a signal re-encoder: it takes the output of the layer beneath it and re-emits it as something that looks like a different kind of problem.

So the dependency on proprietary fonts produces an error that looks like a software rendering issue; the rendering problem produces an error that looks like an implementation shortcoming; and finally the proprietary format structure produces an error that looks like a failure to comply with standards.

By the time the error reaches the user, its origin is completely obscured, and responsibility is systematically redirected to the last element in the chain: the open source software, which was merely trying to display a document designed to defeat it.

This is not a coincidence arising from poor design.

Software that generated random errors would be a problem for the company that developed it, because user frustration would flow back toward the originating software.
A system that generates errors at the boundary with competitors, in such a way that they are always attributed to those competitors, is a competitive asset.

Here the question of intent matters less than the question of structure: whatever the motivation behind the original design decisions, the resulting architecture functions as a constraint, and its effects are observable and measurable.

How policy responded, and where it failed

The policy response to document lock-in has concentrated on the format: mandating the use of ODF and open formats in public procurement, and guaranteeing that government documents can be created and consulted without the use of proprietary software. Unfortunately, these interventions have almost never been paired with penalties to enforce compliance, and the rules have often been ignored.

Moreover, these format mandates have not addressed the use of proprietary fonts in document templates, so by fixing only the upper layer they leave the lower one exposed and fully operational, where it is less visible and less politically salient, and therefore more durable.

Documents continue to fail at the boundary with open source software, and users continue to blame the latter. The political will behind the format mandate is progressively eroded by user complaints about interoperability problems, which seem to contradict the promise of the open, standard format mandate itself.

An institution that deploys LibreOffice but fails to address rendering consistency — allowing a mixed infrastructure of Windows and Linux systems to exchange documents without recognising that rendering variation is not a software defect — risks creating an internal interoperability problem that could be used to justify a return to monoculture.

The rendering layer has received almost no policy attention. No major digital sovereignty framework specifies rendering-fidelity requirements. No procurement standard defines conformance in terms of visual consistency across implementations.

The tools to address this problem — reference rendering implementations, rendering test suites, fidelity benchmarks — exist only as prototypes or proposals, and have not been integrated into any serious policy framework.

Knowing this pattern is a political act

The invisible layering of dependencies is a pattern born of nearly fifty years of unregulated evolution of personal productivity software, and one that threatens to make the path toward digital sovereignty extraordinarily complex.

It matters to give the pattern a name, so that it can be used in policy discussions, in parliamentary questions, in procurement specifications and in the public debate on digital sovereignty, at every level, including by the media.

The invisible layering of dependencies connects phenomena that do not appear to be related — document format incompatibilities, rendering variation, font substitution failures — and shows that they are expressions of the same underlying architecture.

Once these phenomena are seen as a pattern rather than as isolated technical problems, an appropriate policy response becomes clearer, because it is not enough to fix a single layer and mandate a single standard — even though that is a fundamental first step.

It is necessary to make all the dependencies legible and to integrate them into interoperability policies that address format, rendering and fonts explicitly and specifically, with enforcement mechanisms applying to all three layers.

The open source and open standards community has built the technical foundations for genuine interoperability: open formats are mature and solid, open source applications are fully up to the task, and there are hundreds of openly licensed fonts, many of them metric-compatible with the proprietary ones.

The architecture of lock-in does not persist because the alternatives are inadequate. It persists because policy has not yet learned to look beyond the visible surface of format conformance and to recognise the underlying layers where proprietary dependencies go on operating — invisible and ignored — doing the work they were designed to do.

The Document Foundation: the name that pointed at the right thing, 16 years before

When The Document Foundation was announced sixteen years ago, some people found the name a little flat. It didn’t sparkle. It named an object — the document — rather than a product, a movement, or an aspiration. Today, that same name is worth a second look, because it turns out to have pointed at exactly the place the digital sovereignty debate would eventually arrive.

To see why, it helps to ask a simple question: when you are locked into a piece of software, where does the lock actually live?

The intuitive answer is “in the application.” You feel trapped by the program — its menus, its habits, the licence you keep renewing. But the application is replaceable. You can install a different one tomorrow. What you cannot so easily replace is your documents — the years of contracts, records, reports, and correspondence you have produced. And if those documents are saved in a format that only one company’s software can fully read, then the lock was never really in the application at all. It was in the file.

This is the quiet mechanism behind most document lock-in. The format does the trapping. As long as your organisation’s memory is stored in a format controlled by a single vendor, you depend on that vendor to read your own past — and that dependency does not end when you switch programs, because the documents come with you.

This is also why “digital sovereignty” is not, at root, a question about geography or about which company you buy from. It is a question about control: whether you, and not a supplier, hold the keys to your own information over time. An organisation that cannot open its own archives without permission is not sovereign over them, wherever it happens to be located.

The answer is older and simpler than the debate that has grown up around it: open document standards. A document saved in an open, fully published format — one any software can implement, today or in fifty years — belongs to the person who wrote it, not to the company whose program happened to create it. The format stops being a lock and becomes what it should always have been: a neutral container for your own words.

The name said this all along. It put the document at the centre, because the document is where the question is decided. Sixteen years on, the rest of the conversation is catching up — and we have only just begun to scratch the surface.

Euro-Office, open standards, and native ODF

A welcome commitment to open standards — and why it should end with ODF as Euro-Office’s native document format.

The Euro-Office pre-announcement has generated considerable coverage across the European press over the past few days. The Document Foundation welcomes the attention that open standards are receiving — and welcomes still more the commitment the announcement makes to them. Before the discussion settles, we would like to clarify one point and state one expectation.

Several reports have described Euro-Office as “the first European open source office suite.” Reading the pre-announcement carefully, we do not find the coalition making that claim, and it is not one we would endorse. Europe has been building free and open source office software for many years: LibreOffice, developed by this Foundation and a worldwide community, is itself European, mature, and far from alone.

The “first” framing appears to have emerged in the speed of a launch day rather than in the text of the announcement. We note it not to claim precedence — precedence is not the point — but because accuracy serves the cause of open standards better than enthusiasm alone.

Read on its merits, the announcement gives a great deal to welcome. The promise to improve support for the OpenDocument Format is precisely what the European free software community has long asked for, and we take it in good faith and with genuine appreciation. We have always held that sovereignty begins with the format, not with the logo on the application — and a coalition that understands this is one worth encouraging.

We would also state an expectation, in the spirit of encouragement rather than demand. Improved support is a beginning, not a destination. A format that is merely supported is one a suite can read and write as a courtesy, while a native format is the one in which its documents are created, stored, and trusted across the years — and that is precisely where digital sovereignty is won or lost.

The only destination consistent with the sovereignty Euro-Office invokes is ODF as its native document format. A genuinely European, genuinely sovereign office suite cannot treat the open standard as a concession to outsiders, it has to speak ODF as its mother tongue. The Document Foundation looks forward to that moment, and will be glad to acknowledge it when it comes.

An open letter to office suite users, just before the Euro-Office announcement

Dear office suite users,

In recent days you will have read various articles announcing the arrival of Euro-Office, which is being “marketed” as the first open-source office suite developed in Europe. We feel compelled — reluctantly, since open source should rest on transparency, not deception — to correct this claim. The first open-source office suite developed in Europe was OpenOffice.org in 2001, based on StarOffice’s source code, followed by LibreOffice from 2010.

These are two genuine open-source office suites, built from source code that originated in Europe. They are not a freeware clone of MS Office whose code provenance is undisclosed, nor a product that has rebranded itself out of pure opportunism to ride today’s wave of Digital Sovereignty.

It is worth remembering that many of those who champion Digital Sovereignty today were silent back in 2006, when the open ISO/IEC ODF standard — the pillar of Digital Sovereignty — was announced: not only did they not listen to us during all these years, but in some cases they greeted us with a condescending smile.

If we can speak of Digital Sovereignty in Europe today, it is thanks to The Document Foundation and LibreOffice community members at large, who kept the flag of open-source office suites flying when everyone was predicting their demise, and who continued to develop the only truly open and standard format that guarantees Digital Sovereignty, as it provides full user control over content.

Document formats are a subject still rife with misinformation. This is understandable on the part of Microsoft, which developed and controls the horrible proprietary OOXML format, designed precisely to prevent Digital Sovereignty by maintaining content lock-in. It is far less understandable on the part of companies that claim to advocate open source, such as those promoting Euro-Office.

Euro-Office defaults to the fully proprietary OOXML document format, developed and controlled solely by Microsoft. This makes it a de facto ally of Microsoft in its content lock-in strategy, with control remaining firmly in Redmond and far from Europe.

So, despite what is being written in support of Euro-Office — the latest of the office suites developed in Europe, and not the first — the announcement is not against Microsoft. On the contrary, it strengthens Microsoft’s strategy against European Digital Sovereignty, or, if you prefer, against the freedom of European users to control and manage their own content.

A Standard in Name Only: What OOXML Transitional Tells Us About Format Sovereignty

When a public administration is told its documents are stored in “an ISO standard format,” the assumption is reasonable: an ISO standard ought to be a clean, implementable specification that any qualified software vendor can support. Standards exist precisely so that nobody is locked to a single supplier.

OOXML — ISO/IEC 29500, the format behind Microsoft’s docx, xlsx and pptx files — does not work this way.

The standard is split into two conformance classes. Strict is the clean version: a modern document format, free of legacy baggage, that an independent implementer could reasonably support. Transitional is everything else: a vast catalogue of compatibility features, deprecated elements, platform-specific behaviours, and references to undocumented quirks of Microsoft Office versions from the 1990s. The Transitional class exists to ensure that documents converted from the old binary doc, xls and ppt formats can be represented in XML without loss.

There is one detail that matters above all others: Microsoft Office has never produced Strict OOXML by default. The option to save in Strict format is available in the installed desktop applications but is absent from the browser-based versions of Microsoft 365 — and Microsoft’s various editions have long differed in which features they offer, with the macOS version historically providing a different set of options from the Windows version. The “ISO standard” that public administrations are actually storing their documents in, when they use Office, is Transitional — the messy one. Strict is a feature you can find if you know where to look, on the platforms where Microsoft has chosen to support it. That is not the treatment a serious open standard receives.

This has consequences that go well beyond a technicality.

The standard codifies undocumented legacy behaviour. Transitional OOXML contains compatibility flags whose specification amounts to “behave like Word 95” or “lay out footnotes like Word 97.” These are not formal definitions. They are references to the behaviour of specific commercial software products released more than thirty years ago — products whose layout algorithms were never published. An independent implementer wishing to render such a document correctly must reverse-engineer software from the Windows 95 era. This is not standardisation in any meaningful sense; it is the codification of one vendor’s implementation history as a global norm.

The standard perpetuates known bugs. Excel famously treats 1900 as a leap year — it was not — because Lotus 1-2-3 did so in the 1980s, and Microsoft chose binary compatibility with Lotus over arithmetic correctness [1]. OOXML Transitional preserves this bug. The default workbook setting in every xlsx file you have ever opened encodes a date arithmetic error from the era of MS-DOS. A spreadsheet calculating durations across February 1900 will produce wrong answers, and the standard requires this.

The standard includes obsolete graphics formats. Vector Markup Language (VML) was submitted by Microsoft to the W3C in 1998 as a candidate vector graphics standard. The W3C rejected it in favour of SVG. VML should have died there. Instead, it lives on inside OOXML Transitional, because documents converted from doc files contain it, and Microsoft Office continues to emit it. Implementers must support both VML and its modern replacement, DrawingML, to handle real-world files.

The conformance class problem is structural. Strict was meant to be the future and Transitional the temporary bridge. Two decades after standardisation, Transitional remains what Office produces, what users receive, and what any competing implementation must support to be useful. The clean standard exists on paper. The standard that exists in practice — and that Microsoft Office produces by default — is the messy one.

For public administrations, this matters in three specific ways.

For archives. A document format that depends on undocumented behaviour of 1990s applications is not a safe long-term archival format. The ISO label provides a false reassurance: the parts of the standard your documents actually use are precisely the parts that are least specified and most dependent on a single vendor’s tooling.

For procurement. Specifying “ISO/IEC 29500” in a tender does not guarantee interoperability or vendor neutrality. It guarantees that documents will conform to a specification of which the practically deployed variant is, in effect, whatever Microsoft Office does. This is the opposite of what an open standard is meant to deliver.

For sovereignty. European institutions, national governments, and regional administrations increasingly recognise that the choice of document format is a sovereignty question. A format whose definitive reference implementation is a single American company’s commercial product cannot serve as the technical foundation of European digital autonomy — whatever its ISO number.

The alternative is not hypothetical. The OpenDocument Format (ODF), ratified as ISO/IEC 26300 twenty years ago this month, was designed from the outset as an implementer-neutral standard. Its specification is complete, self-contained, and does not require knowledge of any specific commercial product’s history. Multiple independent implementations exist. It is, in the proper sense of the term, an open standard.

For administrations weighing format policy, the question is not whether OOXML is “a standard.” It is. The question is what compliance with that standard actually entails, what it demands of implementers, and whether that serves the long-term interests of the institutions storing their work in it.

For those interested in the technical detail behind these claims, we attach a companion deep-dive [2] cataloguing the Transitional features, their categories, and the specific structural problems they introduce.

[1] The history of the 1900 leap year bug is well documented. Joel Spolsky, who worked on the Excel team at Microsoft in the early 1990s, recounted in My First BillG Review how Excel inherited the bug from Lotus 1-2-3 to preserve binary compatibility. Microsoft’s own support documentation openly acknowledges the bug and explains why it will not be fixed: doing so would invalidate every date in every existing Excel worksheet.

[2] The companion deep dive document in PDF format, cataloguing the Transitional features, their categories, and the specific structural problems they introduce: A Standard in Name Only a Deep Dive

ODF vs OOXML, an issue that should never have existed

A number of journalists read last week’s piece as an attack on Microsoft. We want to explain what they walked past.

Whenever we address the contrast between ODF and OOXML, some people perceive it as a campaign against a company. It is not. We are trying to do something far more useful: to make the structural problem with the standard document format clear to those who have to live with it: public officials, educators, and above all, individual citizens.

All these people find themselves facing a problem they did not create, but which affects them daily, and of which they are often the unwitting victims, every time they create a document or receive one.

The least we can do – and in fact we have been doing it for twenty years, though until now almost no one has listened – is to explain, clearly and without drama, how the problem arose, why it persists, and why ODF is the only way out. It is an educational and selfless goal – we do not sell software, so we have no commercial interest to protect – and not an attack on a company.

The problem concerns the current document landscape, based almost exclusively on a proprietary format controlled by a single company, and what we could have had instead: a standard format controlled by an independent community of stakeholders.

Microsoft features in this story because of the rational-monopolist behaviour it has exhibited since 2006, during and after the standardization of the proprietary OOXML format: first promising the standard and then doing everything possible to ensure it was first ignored and then forgotten, quietly but with extreme determination. All of this to protect a market share now worth over $30 billion, which would have been at risk of erosion if the document format had been genuinely standardized: migration to any other office suite would then have been free of cost and complexity.

Today, most organizations – public agencies, supranational bodies, companies – and most individual users face a problem that, had everyone listened to independent experts between 2006 and 2008, would never have existed. The international standards system and national governments allowed a single vendor – rather than the community of developers, systems analysts and standards scholars who raised objections – to set the terms under which documents would be archived. That vendor chose its own proprietary format.

The problem, in other words, was created by institutions – ISO, national standards bodies, public officials and ultimately politicians – who approached the choice of format for public documents in a completely uncritical manner. They trusted the process despite repeated and legitimate protests about its transparency, and never thought to perform a simple file analysis that would, in a few minutes, have raised more than a few doubts. The industry then followed the vendor’s lead, for convenience, because it expanded the business – without weighing the medium- and long-term consequences for institutions and individual users. What is troubling is that even a segment of the open-source industry went with the flow, and continues to do so, as shown by the fact that today only two open-source office suites – LibreOffice and Collabora Office – use ODF as their native file format.

If between 2006 and 2008 everyone had done their part, today there would be a single open, multi-vendor interoperability standard for office documents – our ODF – governed neutrally and implemented by all. Everyone would have benefited, because document exchange based on a true standard is completely transparent and independent of operating system and application software. Microsoft could have kept its own internal proprietary format as a mere implementation detail, invisible to users, because documents would have flowed seamlessly through the standard. An ideal world that never became reality.

Instead, the accelerated standardization of OOXML through ISO in 2008, against all technical objections, produced the OOXML Transitional format we use today: a temporary compatibility mode, explicitly defined as a bridge to be crossed once and then dismantled. It was not dismantled. It became the only variant used, at every level, by the majority of office suites. Today the vast majority of office documents worldwide – including the public documents of public institutions and of governments everywhere – are saved in a format that its own designers had declared provisional.

Even OOXML Strict would not solve the problem. Microsoft has never promoted it – part, as we have explained, of an understandable strategy – and none of those who were supposed to oversee the process ever requested or verified its implementation by the deadlines promised at standardization, from 2010 onward. But the deeper point is this: Strict is simply a different variant of the same single-vendor format. A standard is not open because its specification has been published. It is open when it is developed through a transparent process that no single company can control, and maintained by an independent community of users and implementers. Replacing Transitional with Strict changes the variant but leaves governance – which is what determines sovereignty – exactly where it was.

So when we advocate for ODF, we are not criticizing anything. We are trying to clarify a problem that was artificially created, and to ask why a problem that was artificially created is treated by most stakeholders – organizations, governments, companies and individuals – as an established fact of nature.

Attention to digital sovereignty is growing, even if resistance remains strong, because awareness of this issue – which should never have arisen in the first place – is still virtually nonexistent, not only among users but among industry professionals themselves.

We continue to believe ODF can regain the role it should have had after 2006, when it was approved – rightly – as an ISO standard, because it had every characteristic of an open standard. The Deutschland Stack restores that role to ODF, and we hope the German government’s decision will not remain isolated.